Martian Colours by Gatzia, Dimitria Electra
  
MARTIAN COLOURS 
Dimitria Electra Gatzia 
(in Philosophical Writings, 37, 2008)  
 
 
Imagine a colour-blind individual who cannot see reds and greens in 
the physical world due to his condition. Does he experience redness or 
greenness? Given his defective vision, he does not. But suppose that when 
he is asked whether he experiences any colours he cannot normally see he 
says “I do experience certain graphemes as having some strange colours. 
They are Martian colours!” Undoubtedly, this would be surprising. Oddly 
enough, researchers have come across such a colour-blind individual who 
experiences synesthetic colours he does not experience by means of seeing 
objects with that colour (Ramachandran et al., 2003). Such and other cases 
involving synesthesia seem to support Grice’s (1989) argument that the 
individualization of sense modalities requires that we take into account the 
introspective character of experience. Ross (2001), however, argues that 
Grice’s argument, if sound, threatens (strong externalist) intentionalism, 
according to which the qualitative character of colour experience is 
exhausted, or fully determined by, its intentional content, and the relevant 
intentional content is determined by the relation between physical properties 
of objects and their effects on the perceiver’s visual system.1 Henceforth the 
term ‘intentionalism’ will be used to refer to strong externalist 
intentionalism unless it is otherwise indicated. In defense of intentionalism, 
Ross proposes a set of criteria for the individuation of sense modalities 
without appealing to the introspective character of experience. However, I 
shall argue that recent studies on synesthesia present difficulties for Ross’ 
                                                      
1 This version of intentionalism is relevant to my argument because it is the view that Ross 
endorses. It is “externalist” because it says that the intentional properties of colour experience 
can be explained by reference to colour properties of external physical objects (see Ross 2001, 
p. 495). And it is “strong” (externalist) because it says that the content of a subject’s experience 
is not entirely fixed by the intrinsic properties of the subject –that is, no content is narrow (see 
Dretske 1999, Tye 2000). For a further defense of this type of intentionalism see Hilbert and 
Byrne 2003. For arguments against it see Wright 2003 and Pautz 2006. 
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account on the one hand, and intentionalism on the other. To see this, let us 
begin with Grice’s account. 
Grice (1989) formulates the following criteria for distinguishing one 
sense modality from another, e.g., x-ing and y-ing: 
 
i. x-ing and y-ing are characterized by directly perceiving (or seeming to 
perceive) things as having certain properties such as colours, sounds, 
smells, etc. (The property condition) 
ii. x-ing and y-ing, e.g., seeing and smelling, have distinct introspective 
character. (The introspective-character condition) 
iii. x-ing and y-ing are responsive to a distinct sort of stimulus such as 
wavelengths, sound waves, etc. (The stimulus condition) 
iv. x-ing and y-ing are associated with a distinct sort of internal 
mechanism. (The sensory-organ condition)2 
 
Grice argues that (i) and (ii) are distinct conditions even though it might 
initially appear that the former is incorporated in the latter. Moreover, (ii) 
cannot be replaced by one or a combination of the other conditions. In 
support of this claim Grice invokes the following thought experiment: 
Friendly Martians have landed on earth. It turns out that no verb in their 
language unquestionably corresponds to the verb “see” used on Earth.  
 
Instead we find two verbs which we decide to render as “x” and “y”: we 
find that (in their tongue) they speak of themselves as x-ing, and also y-ing, 
things to be of this or that color. (1989, p. 261)  
 
Do the Martians have two distinct senses x-ing and y-ing or do they have 
one sense which involves two distinct organs? Grice argues that without 
condition (ii) the answer to this question would be that “both x-ing and y-ing 
are seeing, with different pair of organs” (ibid). Grice, however, thinks that 
the issue cannot be settled “so easily” (ibid). He argues that to know 
whether x-ing is distinct from y-ing we must ask the Martians whether x-ing 
something to be blue is like y-ing it to be blue. If the Martians were to say 
“Oh no, there’s all the difference in the world!” the right conclusion to draw 
would be that x-ing and y-ing are distinct senses even though both x-ing and 
y-ing are characterized by directly perceiving the same property, e.g. 
                                                      
2 The names attributed with each condition (seen in italics) are taken from Ross 2001. 
  3 
blueness (ibid). Grice concludes that (ii) cannot be replaced by one or a 
combination of the other conditions since the difference between x-ing 
something to be blue and y-ing it to be blue cannot be captured without 
reference to the introspective-character of the Martian’s experience. 
Ross takes Grice’s argument to constitute an argument against 
intentionalism because it suggests that there is “a qualitative aspect of 
perceptual experience which cannot be identified with the physical 
properties of physical objects that experience represents” (Ross 2001, p. 
498). To avoid this conclusion, Ross proposes an alternative account that is 
consistent with intentionalism: 
 
(i.') x-ing and y-ing specialise in directly perceiving some range of 
properties of physical objects such as colours or sounds (This is the 
modified property condition) 
(ii.') x-ing and y-ing are receptive to a distinct sort of stimulus such as 
wavelengths, sound waves, etc. (the stimulus condition) 
(iii.') x-ing is associated with the workings of a different sort of sensory 
organ than y-ing (the sensory-organ condition)3 
 
The main difference between the two accounts is that Grice’s conditions (i) 
and (ii) have been replaced by (iʹ′). In this view, x-ing is distinct from y-ing 
just in case conditions (iʹ′) through (iiiʹ′) are satisfied. More generally, 
according to Ross’ account, sense modalities are individuated by the range 
of properties of external objects they specialise in perceiving. For example, 
vision can be distinguished from smell in virtue of the range of properties 
each specialises in perceiving; the former specialises in perceiving colour 
while the latter specialises in perceiving scent or odour. 
Before evaluating Ross’ account it is worth stating the reasons that 
lead him to claim that Grice’s Martian thought experiment threatens 
intentionalism. Recall that intentionalism says that the qualitative character 
of colour experience is exhausted, or fully determined, by its intentional 
content; and the relevant intentional content is determined by the relation 
between physical properties of objects and their effects on the perceiver’s 
visual system.4 Suppose that both senses, e.g., x-ing and y-ing, represent the 
same colour property, e.g., blueness. According to Ross, the intentional 
                                                      
3 See Ross 2001, p. 500. 
4 For simplicity, I will henceforth focus primarily on colour properties. 
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content of the Martian’s experience of x-ing something to be blue can be 
identified with the physical property her experience represents the object as 
having.5 Similarly, the intentional content of the Martian’s experience of y-
ing something to be blue can be identified with the physical property her 
experience represents the object as having. Since the qualitative character of 
colour experience is exhausted, or fully determined by, its intentional 
content, x-ing something to be blue would be like y-ing something to be 
blue. But, by hypothesis, x-ing something to be blue is not like y-ing it to be 
blue. The experiences produced by x-ing something to be blue and y-ing it 
to be blue have different qualitative character. It follows that the qualitative 
character of colour experience is not exhausted, or fully determined by, its 
intentional content. Thus, intentionalism is false.6 If this argument is cogent, 
Grice’s introspective-character condition, i.e., (ii), cannot be replaced by (i) 
(or a combination of (i), (iii), and (iv)). 
To avoid this conclusion, Ross eliminates Grice’s introspective-
character condition (ii) and replaces Grice’s property condition (i) with the 
modified-property condition (iʹ′). The only difference between (i) and (iʹ′) is 
that the latter allows that a sense modality specialises in directly perceiving 
a range of properties while the former requires only that it specialises in 
directly perceiving (or seeming to perceive) things as having certain 
properties. This is important because Ross wants to deny that x-ing and y-
ing are instances of directly perceiving the same property. Ross maintains 
that his account can individuate x-ing and y-ing on the basis of the range of 
properties each perceives. Thus, contrary to Grice, sense modalities can be 
individuated without reference to the qualitative character of experience. In 
particular, Ross maintains that if both x-ing and y-ing are specialised in 
perceiving the same range of properties, then x-ing is not distinct from y-
ing. On the other hand, if x-ing and y-ing are not specialised in perceiving 
the same range of properties, then x-ing is distinct from y-ing. This, 
however, misses Grice’s point that the matter cannot be settled so easily 
given their qualitative differences. But there is a further complication, 
                                                      
5 Provided, of course, that the experience is veridical. 
6 This argument targets strong externalist intentionalism. A Fregean intentionalist, for example, 
could perhaps explain such qualitative differences since she maintains that qualitative 
properties are identical to Fregean representational properties. Qualitative (or phenomenal) 
blueness, in this case, is identical to the property of having a certain Fregean content which 
involves a mode of presentation “such as the property that normally causes experiences of 
phenomenal [blueness]” (see Chalmers 2004, p. 174).  
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namely recorded interactions between sense modalities. Ross acknowledges 
such occurrences and argues that even if, say, taste interacts with smell, the 
sense modalities can nevertheless be individuated by reference to the range 
of distinct properties they specialise in perceiving, i.e., flavour and odour 
respectively. Alternatively, one could admit that taste and smell cannot be 
characterized independently and “conclude that flavour and odour are not 
distinct properties” (Ross 2001, p. 502). Which response is best will depend 
on the “answer to the question whether or not flavour and odour are distinct 
properties” (ibid). This then suggests that the success of Ross’ account 
depends on whether perceptual properties can be individuated 
independently of the senses. If they cannot, his account will be circular: it 
would individuate sense modalities by reference to distinct perceptual 
properties and it would individuate perceptual properties by reference to 
distinct sense modalities. But if they can, we could first individuate 
perceptual properties by identifying them with physical properties of 
external objects and then use these physical properties to individuate sense 
modalities. Many philosophers and vision scientists, however, deny that 
perceptual properties, including colours, can be identified with physical 
properties of external objects.7 If they are right, the qualitative character of 
experience cannot be explained by reference to the properties a sense 
modality specialises in perceiving. But even if it is assumed that perceptual 
properties can be identified with physical properties of objects, Ross’ 
account faces a further difficulty. 
Ross admits that cases of extreme interaction between different sense 
modalities seem to undermine his account. If the Martian case involves such 
an extreme interaction between x-ing and y-ing, Ross’ modified property 
condition (i') would be insufficient to distinguish x-ing from y-ing since 
both are associated with the same range of properties. Those who think that 
such epistemic matters cannot be settled a priori will be reluctant to draw 
any conclusions from Grice’s thought experiment. However, Ross 
acknowledges that synesthesia, an actual phenomenon which involves 
extreme interactions among the senses, seems to undermine his account: 
                                                      
7 The nature and existence of colours are especially controversial issues in philosophy and 
vision science. This is a serious threat to Ross’ account since many philosophers and colour 
scientists offer compelling arguments for the claim that perceived colours cannot be identified 
with physical properties of objects, e.g., wavelengths, spectral reflectance profiles, and so on. 
See, for example, Hering 1964, Hardin 1998, Maund 1995, Gouras and Zrenner 1981, as well 
as Werner and Webster 2002. 




However, a rare condition called synaesthesia suggests an interaction 
among senses which is so extreme as to undermine use of the modified 
property condition. For those with synaesthesia, a property characteristic of 
one modality produces experiences in more than one modality –so, for 
example, a sound produces a colour image as well as an auditory 
experience. (2001, p. 502) 
 
Developmental synesthesia typically involves either (a) the stimulation of 
one sensory modality giving rise to an experience in a different modality 
(when a sound, for example, gives rise to a colour experience) or (b) the 
stimulation of a single sensory modality giving rise to different qualitative 
aspects of experience (when the sight of a number, for example, gives rise 
to a colour experience). Henceforth I shall refer to (a) as ‘type-a’ and to (b) 
as ‘type-b’ synesthesia. Such cases threaten Ross’ account because they 
undermine his claim that each sense specialises in perceiving a range of 
properties. 
Ross quickly dismisses synesthesia as a possible counterexample to 
his claim on the basis that it involves experiences which are merely 
associative rather than perceptual in nature. Ross argues that synesthetic 
experiences are not perceptual because they do not involve direct 
perception. A perception of a certain property is direct if it is “non-
inferential” in the sense that it is not epistemically mediated by another 
property: 
 
Perception of property P1 is direct so long as it is not epistemically 
mediated by perception of some other property P2, i.e., if we do not infer 
that something has P1 on the basis of its having P2. (Ross 2001, p. 501) 
 
Ross notes that although we often say things like the “couch looks soft or a 
flower looks sweet smelling” such experiences do not involve direct 
perception because we infer that the couch is soft from the visual properties 
we associate with softness, e.g., the texture of its textile. Similarly, he 
argues, in synesthetic experiences one property such as colour is inferred 
from another such as sound. Ross cites Cytowic (1995) who claims that 
individuals who have the same sensory pairings tend to have different 
synesthetic responses. Indeed, there are numerous “individual differences in 
the specific mapping between the senses involved” as well as “remarkable 
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variability of the nature of the experience (e.g., vividness, spatial, extent, 
affective components)” (Sagiv 2005, p. 7). For example, one synesthete 
might experience a grapheme such as the letter A as red while another might 
experience it as brown; beef might taste dark blue to one synesthete but 
yellow to another; the smell of almonds can be pale orange to one but blue 
to another, and so on. Ross infers that synesthetic experiences are a “mere 
association rather than direct perception” from the idiosyncratic nature of 
synesthetic experience (2001, p. 503). This inference, however, is invalid. It 
does not follow from the idiosyncratic nature of synesthetic experiences that 
synesthesia is not a genuine perceptual phenomenon. Non-synesthetic 
colour experiences are equally idiosyncratic in nature. There are, for 
example, well established intrasubjective and intersubjective colour 
variations among normal subjects.8 But this is hardly a reason for deny-ing 
that colour experiences are a genuine perceptual phenomenon. Similarly, the 
idiosyncratic nature of synesthetic experiences is hardly a reason for deny-
ing that synesthetic experiences are a genuine perceptual phenomenon. 
There are further reasons for resisting Ross’ claim. Studies show that 
subjects with developmental synesthesia have experiences which are 
“involuntarily and simultaneously perceived as if by one or more… senses” 
such as sight and hearing or smell and sound (Day 2005, p. 12). Such 
synesthetic subjects do not infer that something has P1 on the basis of its 
having P2. For example Day, who is a type-a synesthete study-ing 
synesthesia, experiences an extreme interaction between taste and vision. 
He reports that for him “the taste of beef is dark blue” while “the smell of 
almonds is pale orange” (2005, p. 11). Another synesthete reports that she 
“smells music” (Day 2005, p. 15). Ramachandran et al. (2005) encountered 
a type-a synesthete who “experienced the sound of a French tenor’s voice as 
being simultaneously red and green” (2005, p. 161). Another bilingual type-
a synesthete experienced synesthetic colours in only one of the languages 
she spoke while another experienced numbers, but not roman numerals, as 
having synesthetic colours (ibid). In a separate experiment, Blake et al. 
asked type-b synesthetic subjects to name the synesthetic colour they saw a 
specific grapheme as having when placed in two distinct contexts, an 
approximation of which is seen here:  
 
[A 13 C]    [12 13 14]  
                                                      
8 See Webster et al. 2000, Kuehni 2004, and Malkoc et al. 2005.  




Surprisingly, the subjects described the same character (13) as having one 
colour when seen in one context – being among the letters – but as having 
another or no synesthetic colour when seen in the other context – being 
among the numbers (Blake et al. 2005). Another synesthetic subject 
experienced an afterimage induced by an achromatic grapheme as having 
the synesthetic colour she normally sees it as having. Since the synesthetic 
colour she normally sees the letter A as having is red, she reported having 
experienced the induced afterimage of the letter A as being red (Blake et al. 
2005).9 Although some synesthetes report to only imagine or associate one 
property with another, many report that they simultaneously experience 
these properties “in [their] head” (Ramachandran et al. 2005, p. 162). 
Moreover, type-b synesthetes “describe seeing their colors upon the 
achromatic letters themselves, not simply in their mind’s eye” (Blake et al. 
2005, p. 48). As Blake et al. note, “this description would place them in the 
category of “projective” synesthetes as opposed to “associative”” (ibid). 
Ramachandran et al. also found that type-b synesthetes saw synesthetic 
colours “spatially in the same location as the grapheme and insisted that ‘it 
is not just memory’” (2001, p. 979). Even when presented with graphemes 
matching their synesthetic colours, synesthetes reported that the graphemes 
remained “synesthetically visible” (Blake et al. 2005, p. 49). Ramachandran 
et al. argue that “[t]aken collectively these results strongly suggest that 
synaesthesia is a genuine perceptual effect” (2001, p. 982). 
Ross could argue that these findings do not establish that synesthetic 
experiences are not merely associative because the evidence presented thus 
far is based on verbal testimony. The reason we think that these subjects 
have synesthetic experiences which are not merely associative, he might 
argue, is that they report that they have them. But this is insufficient to 
establish that they are in fact having such experiences since their reports 
could be at best mistaken and at worse misleading.10 In order to rule out the 
possibility that these reports are based on either mistaken or misleading 
                                                      
9 This is an especially interesting finding since afterimages arise from processes in the neural 
stage (as opposed to the retinal stage) of the visual system, which processes and encodes 
information about the stimuli the photoreceptors (in the retinal stage) collect. If perceived 
colours are produced by neural connections, and not by directly perceiving physical properties 
of objects, intentionalism is unmotivated. 
10 The claim here is not that synesthetes do not have first-person knowledge about their 
experiences but rather an expression of doubt about the accuracy of their reports. 
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reports scientists have devised experiments whose results do not depend on 
verbal testimony, but rather on the ability to perform tasks. Blake et al. 
asked type-b synesthetes to match their synesthetic colours using “one of 
the color palettes from Adobe Photoshop” (2005, p. 49). He found that they 
“typically spend considerable time getting each color just right” when 
performing the matches (ibid). As a result, their colour matches were 
remarkably reliable. Blake et al. argue that this shows that “their 
experiences are subtle and not simply categorical in nature” (ibid). In a 
separate experiment, Blake et al. showed one synesthete an array of black 
graphemes, e.g., 5s, surrounding similarly looking graphemes, e.g., 2s, 
(similar to the arrangement seen in figure 1) and asked him to describe what 
he saw. “Without hesitation, he exclaimed that the 2 stood out 
conspicuously from the 5s because it was a different color” (p. 52). In a 
series of similar experiments, synesthetes where presented with a matrix of 
graphemes, e.g., 2s, forming a triangle embedded in a display of similarly 
looking graphemes, e.g., 5s (as seen in figure 1) and asked to describe what 
they saw. Unlike non-synesthetes, synesthetes were able to identify the 
triangle with far greater speed and accuracy than non-synesthetes. 
Ramachandran et al. (2005) constructed similar experiments that “show that 
even the detection of symmetry (normally thought to be preattentive11) can 
be based on synesthetically induced splotches of color” (p. 151). These 
findings suggest that synesthetic experiences are not merely associative.  
Ross might insist that showing that synesthesia is a genuine 
perceptual phenomenon requires showing that the synesthetic subjects 
correctly represent the colours of objects.12 In support of this claim, Ross 
could cite the colour-blind synesthete who is able to see “numbers tinged 
with hues he otherwise could not perceive” due to his defective visual 
system (Ramachandran et al. 2005, p. 165.) He “quite charmingly” referred 
to these colours as “‘Martian Colors’ [because they] were ‘weird’ and 
seemed quite ‘unreal’” (Ramachandran et al. 2005, p. 165). Although “his 
retinal color receptors cannot process certain wavelengths,” Ramachandran 
et al. maintain that “his brain color area is working just fine” (2003, p. 57). 
                                                      
11 Smilek et al. also argue that “attention is not a necessary condition for the binding of 
synesthetic colors and graphemes” (2005, p. 83). This is important because it strengthens the 
hypothesis that, at least some, synesthetic experiences are not merely associative. 
12 Ross made this argument in his commentary at the American Philosophical Association, 
Central Division, 2009. 
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The same explanation, i.e., that synesthetic experiences arise due to 
abnormalities in their visual system, Ross might argue, applies more 
generally to all synesthetic experiences. This explanation, if correct, would 
be particularly helpful to Ross. It would not only establish that synesthesia 
is not a counterexample to his account but it would also safeguard 
intentionalism. For, if synesthetic colour experiences are the result of 
abnormal vision, these experiences cannot count as veridical. Although this 
claim would be of great help to Ross, it is problematic. Unlike the colour-
blind synesthete, most synesthetes do have normal vision. As Blake et al. 
note, “[b]oth of our adult synesthetes (one male one female) have perfectly 
normal color vision, including excellent trichromatic color perception as 
assessed by the modified version of the Munsell 100-Hue test and the 
Ichihara color plates” (2005, p. 48). This suggests that synesthetic 
experiences cannot be ruled out as illusory on the basis of abnormal vision. 
Perhaps Ross could argue that although synesthetes have normal 
vision, their experiences are nevertheless illusory because they do 
misrepresent the colours of things. The notion of veridicality Ross would 
have to employ to rule out that synesthetic experiences are veridical is based 
on the idea that objects have certain properties such as colours and these 
properties are represented in visual experience when that experience is 
veridical.13 Synesthetic experiences would be illusory in this sense since 
they would not be produced in the right way. For example, they might be 
produced by cross-activation between different sense modalities. Indeed, 
Sagiv notes that “synesthesia is often seen as representing a sort of 
dysfunction” and that “these ideas assume cross-activation between 
otherwise normally developed modules, either via disinhibition of normally 
present connections or through abnormal connectivity” (2005, p. 6). But he 
cautions that this belief, although widely held, is not based on “direct 
demonstration of abnormal connectivity in synesthetes” (ibid). The fact that 
researchers were able to induce synesthesia in non-synesthetic subjects 
through hypnosis adds support to the claim that there synesthesia is not 
produced by cross-activation or, if it is, it is not unique to synesthetes 
(Kadosh-Cohen et al. 2009). But there is a further worry with this notion of 
veridicality.  
If it turns out that perceptual properties cannot be identified with 
some range of physical properties of objects, then all colour experiences, 
                                                      
13 This allows that normal subjects can, and often do, misrepresent the colours of things.  
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not just synesthetic ones, would turn out to be illusory. This would be fatal 
for Ross’ account which attempts to individuate sense modalities by 
reference to such a range of properties. Thus, a great deal hangs on whether 
colours are, in fact, physical properties of objects. More importantly, this 
notion of veridicality seems to leave out one important fact, namely that 
perceptual experiences affect one’s ability to perform certain tasks. 
Synesthetic experiences often improve one’s performance. A synesthetic 
subject’s typing speed doubled, for example, after replacing the graphemes 
on her keyboard to match her synesthetic colours (Day, 2005). But they can 
also hinder one’s performance. Smilek et al. (2005) found that type-b 
synesthetes made more errors locating a grapheme presented against a 
coloured background when the synesthetic colour of the grapheme matched 
the (real) colour of the background. Blake et al. also found that type-b 
synesthetes made more errors identifying the colour of words when the 
colour of the word did not match the subject’s synesthetic colour. When the 
words did not match his synesthetic colours, he took longer to identify the 
colour and even “stumbled over many words” (2005, p. 51). But when the 
word matched the subject’s synesthetic colour, he responded quickly 
without compromising his accuracy. Similar difficulties arise for non-
synesthetes who often find it difficult to quickly and accurately identify the 
colour of colour terms such as ‘red’ when their letters have different colours 
such as blue (i.e., RED). Despite the fact that synesthetic experiences 
enhance, and in some cases inhibit, one’s ability to perform certain tasks, 
the intentionalist maintains that they cannot be veridical unless they directly 
represent the colours of things which are to be identified with physical 
properties or objects instantiated in one’s environment.14 However, as Sagiv 
rightly points out, synesthesia “reminds us that whatever is represented 
cannot merely be a copy of the corresponding object, event,” property, and 
so on (2005, p. 7).  
I have argued that dismissing synesthesia as a possible 
counterexample to Ross’ account requires establishing either that 
synesthetic experiences are not perceptual or, if they are, that they are 
illusory. Studies, however, show that neither of these claims is plausible. If 
Grice is right that the introspective-character condition (ii) cannot be 
eliminated, Ross’ proposal fails and along with it his defense of 
                                                      
14 I thank Wayne Wright for bringing this to my attention. 






Figure 1  
                                                      
15 I thank the panel at the American Philosophical Association, Central Division 2009, for 
discussion and Peter Ross for commentary; the RSSS faculty and students at the Australia 
National University; and the participants at the panel at the Australasian Association of 
Philosophy in New Zealand in 2008. I also thank L. C. Hardin and an anonymous referee for 
helpful comments on previous drafts.  
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